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INTRODUCTION

On June 20, 1997, attorneys representing the nation's tobacco industry and
states suing the industry to recover tobacco-related Medicaid expenditures
announced a historic settlement. Under the settlement, tobacco companies would
pay $368.5 billion over twenty-five years to compensate states for smoking-related
medical expenditures, to fund a nationwide anti-smoking campaign, and to
underwrite health care for uninsured children.' The industry would admit for the
first time that smoking is addictive. The tobacco companies would agree to stronger
product labels declaring tobacco's lethality and addictivenesse and also agree to
more stringent restrictions on the advertising of tobacco products. The
unprecedented terms of the settlement seemed unattainable only ayear earlier when

* Associate Professor of Law, University ofMissouri (Kansas City) School ofLaw. A.B., Harvard
College, 1988; M.Phil., Oxford University, 1990; D.Phil., Oxford University, 1992; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1995. I am indebted to Doug Linder, Robert Atherton, and W. Christopher Hillman for their
input in the production of this article.
1. John M. Broder, CigaretteMakers in a $368 Billion Accord to Curb Lawsuits and Curtail
Marketing: Major Concessions,N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1997, at 1.

2.Id.
3. The complex agreementwould prohibit all cigarette advertisements targeting underage smokers.
It would ban human and cartoon characters in tobacco advertisements, Internet advertising, and tobacco
product placements in movies and on television. The proposal would also prohibit distributing
merchandise bearing cigarette logos and sponsoring sporting events or outdoor concerts. Id.
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the industry and its damning documents appeared unshakable behind the ramparts
of attorney-client privilege.
The settlement did not end the battle: the agreement contemplated, among

other things, Congress's limiting the tobacco industry's liability in future lawsuits.4
Close congressional scrutiny of the deal was inevitable, and some members of
Congress were not content to confine their inspection to the terms of the settlement
itself. In August 1997, a proposal emerged in the Senate to limit the contingency
fees paid to the private attorneys representing the various states. Specifically, the
proposed amendment would disallow the payment of fees at a rate exceeding $250
per hour and would limit total attorneys' fees in any single state to $5 million.'
Consequently, the proposal would void the contingency fee contracts established
inthe involved states atthe outset of the lawsuits. In November 1997, Senator Orrin
G. Hatch (R-UT) introduced a second proposal to limit attorneys' fees in the Senate.
As part of a larger tobacco settlement bill, Hatch's proposal would establish an
arbitration panel to determine attomeys' fees with a fee ceiling set at five percent
of the amount paid to the relevant state in each fiscal year.' Like the first proposal,
it would effectively void existing contingency fee contracts between the states and
their private attomeys. For the sake of simplicity, this article will refer to the first
proposal throughout the following analysis, with the understanding that the second
proposal presents the same constitutional problems.
This article assesses the constitutional questions raised by a congressionally
imposed cap on such attorneys' fees and concludes that it would be unconstitutional
if enacted. Two constitutional barriers prohibit this interference with existing
contracts between states and their private attorneys. The first is the limitation on
federal power reflected in the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.7
Taken together, three recent Supreme Court opinions, Gregory v. Ashcroft,8 New
Yorkv. UnitedStates,9 and rrintz v. UnitedStates,'0 present a consistent approach
to understanding the Tenth Amendment and the scope of constitutionally protected
state sovereignty-an approach that does not brook congressional interference with
the terms of contracts negotiated by state governments. From these recent decisions,
one may infer that the Constitution protects the autonomous decision-making
authority of states in certain protected spheres. This article considers the three
decisions in turn, describing how each contributes to a coherent understanding of

4. See id.; John M. Broder & Barry Meier, Tobacco Accord, Once Applauded, IsAll But Buried,
N.Y. TIMwES, Sept. 14, 1997, at 1.
5. Sessions amend. 1125 proposed to amend Durbin amend. 1078 as an amendment to S. 1061,
105th Cong. (1997), in 143 CONG. REc. S9025 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1997).

6. S. 1530, 105th Cong. § 227 (1997).
7. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constit,tion, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
8. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).

9. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
10. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/4
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state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment and explaining the implications for any
congressional attempt to cap tobacco litigation attorneys' fees."
The second constitutional barrier to this interference with existing contracts
between states and their private attorneys operates independently of the Tenth
Amendment limitation. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment proscribes
uncompensated public taking of private property.'2 Although the particular Fifth
Amendment claim that would arise from these contracts would be a novel one, the
underlying doctrines are well established in takings jurisprudence. These doctrines
support the conclusion that federal negation of a contract between a state and a
private firm, under which the firm possesses a reliance-based claim of entitlement,
constitutes a taking of private property without compensation.' 3
II. THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE
[Tihe local or municipal authorities form distinct and
independentportions of the supremacy, no more subject within
theirrespective spheres to the generalauthority,than the general
authorityis subject to them, within its own sphere.4
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution makes explicit the
underlying notion in the Constitution that the federal government is limited to only
those discrete, enumerated powers that may be found in the constitutional text. s
The terms of the Tenth Amendment affirm that residual state sovereignty exists in
all other areas: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."' 6 As the Court reiterated in Printz,the American constitutional structure

11. See infra Part 11.
12. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, withoutjust compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
13. See infra Part III.
14. THE FEDERALISTNO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
15. U.S. CONST. amend X; see Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2376-77. If one assumes the constitutional
framework of enumerated powers (that the Constitution only confers upon the federal government the
powers specified in the constitutional text), then the Tenth Amendment appears somewhat truistic. In
the words of Justice Stone, "[t]he amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). These words echoed Justice Story's
commentary a century earlier: "This amendment is a mere affirmation of what, upon any just
reasoning, is a necessary rule of interpreting the Constitution. Being an instrument of limited and
enumerated powers, it follows irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the
state authorities." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1009, at 711-12 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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is one of "'dual sovereignty,"".' 7 under which the states retain "'a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty.""' 8
The Framers averred that the distribution of powers between these competing
sovereignties preserved considerable state authority:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal
Government, are few and defined.... The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.' 9
Yet in an era of distended federal regulatory powers under the Interstate Commerce
Clause" and the Taxing and Spending Clause,2' the extent and nature of this
inviolable sovereignty retained by the states are unclear. Also uncertain is whether
the Tenth Amendment contains any independent restriction on federal power
beyond the limitation already implied by the enumeration and description of powers
in the body of the Constitution. The Court has suggested that "[w]hile the Tenth
Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism,'... it is not without significance.
The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system."' But the phrases "States' integrity" and
"function effectively in a federal system" resound with ambiguity. The Court has
struggled since 1937 to describe with any precision the boundaries and nature of the
state sovereignty that is manifest in the Tenth Amendment.'
In 1976 the Court attempted to breathe new life into the Tenth Amendment in
NationalLeague of Citiesv. Usery 24 by declaring that Congress may not "directly
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional

17. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
18. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALISTNo. 39, at 56 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
19. THE FEDERALISTNO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
20. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce... among the several States
.... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
21. "The Congress shall have PowerTo lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ... "U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 1.
22. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,547 n.7 (1975) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 124 (1941)).
23. The relevant starting point is 1937 because in that year, the Court began its long retreat from
the battle to significantly contain congressional power conferred by the Interstate Commerce Clause.
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding the National Labor Relations

Act of 1935 to be a constitutional exercise of congressional commerce powers).

24.426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding unconstitutional the extension ofminimum wage and maximum
hour provisions of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local employees
in areas oftraditional governmental functions and overruling Marylandv. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/4
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government functions."25 Striking down federal interference with the minimum
wages and maximum hours of municipal fire and police departments, the Court
stressed that such responsibilities were among "those governmental services which
the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their
citizens."26 Unlike the pre-1937 holdings regarding state sovereignty,27 a critical
facet of the NationalLeague of Cities approach was that it did not bar federal
regulation of private entities in areas traditionally left to state or local control.
Rather, the Court recognized constitutional protection against federal regulation for
the state and local governments themselves. The Court averred that "the States as
States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when
challenging the exercise of Congress'[s] power to regulate commerce."2
For nine years, the Court struggled to apply the NationalLeague of Cities
holding in other contexts.29 Finally, in Garciav. San Antonio MetropolitanTransit
Authority," the Court retreated from the functions-based approach of National
25. Id. at 852.
26. Id. at 851.
27. See, for example, Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), where the Court held
unconstitutional the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.
So far as [a manufacturer] produces or manufactures a commodity, his business
is purely local. So far as he sells and -ships, or contracts to sell and ship, the
commodity to customers in another state, he engages in interstate commerce. In
respect of the former, he is subject only to regulation by the state; in respect ofthe
latter, to regulation only by the federal government.
Id. at 303. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251 (1918), the Court declared unconstitutional the
federal attempt to regulate child labor by prohibiting transportation in interstate commerce of childmade goods.
[T]he necessary effect of this act is, by means of a prohibition against the
movement in interstate commerce of ordinary commercial commodities, to
regulate the hours of labor of children in factories and mines within the States, a
It not only transcends the authority delegated to
purely state authority ....
Congress over commerce but also exerts a power as to a purely local matter to
which the federal authority does not extend.
Id. at 276. Furthermore, in UnitedStatesv. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court held that the
lower court properly dismissed the government civil action under the Sherman Act to set aside a
monopolistic acquisition of other refineries by one sugar refining company.
It cannot be denied that the power of a State to protect the lives, health, and
property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals, ... is
a power originally and always belonging to the States, not surrendered by them
to the general government .... The relief of the citizens of each State from the
burden of monopoly and the evils resulting from the restraint oftrade among such
citizens was left with the States to deal with.
Id. at 11.
28. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854.
29. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding application of federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to state employees); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455
U.S. 678 (1982) (upholding application of federal Railway Labor Act to state-owned railroad); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding federal regulation
of strip mining).
30. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding application of federal FLSA minimum-wage and overtime
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League of Cities and concluded that "[t]hus far, this Court itself has made little
headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed protected
under National League of Cities."'" The Court described it as "difficult, if not
impossible, to identify an organizing principle" for the recognition of traditional
government functions. 2 Since Garcia,the Court has not attempted to revive the
functions-based approach to defining state autonomy.
However, in three landmark decisions between 1991 and 1997, without seeking
to define traditional state functions, the Court traced a new set of constitutional
boundaries that protects state sovereignty and reasserts the Tenth Amendment as an
independent check on federal action.3 At first blush, these three decisions may
appear to lack a shared organizing principle. However, a common core is
discernible: all three cases may be understood as recognizing constitutional
protection of the states' autonomous decision-makingauthority.This new line of
jurisprudence prohibits congressional action that commandeers or controls the
instruments of state government in the creation or implementation of laws. In other
words, the Constitution bars Congress from forcing state governments to make
legislative or executive decisions in accordance with Congress's wishes. As did
NationalLeagueofCities,these cases concern congressional regulation of the states
as states.
A. Gregory v. Ashcroft
In the first of the recent state sovereignty cases, Gregory v. Ashcroft, state
judges in Missouri asserted the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) as a challenge to the Missouri Constitution's requirement that most state
judges retire at the age of seventy.34 The Court resolved the issue by holding that the
ADEA's exemption for government "appointee[s] 'on the policymaking level"'
included judges, thus construing the law to avoid a conflict with the Missouri
Constitution.35 In so doing, the Court reiterated its "plain statement rule" that any
congressional undertaking to alter the constitutional balance between the states and
the federal government must be explicit and unmistakable in the language of the
congressional act. Otherwise, the default presumption that Congress does not intend
to trench upon the powers of the states must guide judicial interpretation of the act.36

provisions to municipal transit authority and overruling NationalLeagueof Cities).
31.Id.at 539.
32. Id.
33. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
34. 501 U.S. 452, 455 (1991); see Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26. The judges also challenged the
Missouri constitutional provision under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.
35. Gregory,501 U.S. at 466-67 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1994)).
36. Id. at 460-61.
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Gregory might seem out of place in a list of decisions demonstrating a new
judicial approach to the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty. Had the Court
said no more, it would be. However, in writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
expounded at great length upon the nature of state sovereignty.3" This elaboration
provided the theoretical underpinning of the plain statement rule: "This plain
statement rule is nothing more than an acknowledgment that the States retain
substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which
Congress does not readily interfere."38 The Court asseverated that the federal
government may not intermeddle with certain state governmental decisions. The
specification of qualifications for state judges is such a determination--"a decision
'
of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity."39
The states' "'power to
prescribe the qualifications of their own officers.., should be exclusive, and free
from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of
the United States."' 40 The Court stressed that "[c]ongressional interference with this
decision ofthe people of Missouri ...
would upset the usual constitutional balance
of federal and state powers."4 ' These statements acknowledging the decisionmaking prerogatives of states were the first tentative strokes in the Court's recent
depiction of the state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.
Justice O'Connor's statements concerning state sovereignty also have
portentous implications for the proposed attorneys' fees cap. If an elected officer of
a state negotiates a contract with a private entity for legal assistance in the recovery
of medical expenditures for smoking-related illnesses, Congress may not secondguess the state and effectively alter the terms of the contract. A state's capacity to
negotiate its contracts without federal tampering is an important way in which a
state expresses itself as a sovereign entity. Respect for autonomous state decision
making is essential in our system of dual federalism. Without such autonomy,
American federalism would likely come to resemble political systems in which
subnational polities play only a subordinate and facilitating role. For example, in the
Federal Republic of Germany's cooperative federalism framework, the Lander
governments' chief responsibility is to implement the decisions of the national

37. See id. at 457-64. One might regard the Court's long discourse on state sovereignty as
unnecessary to its holding and therefore obiter dicta.However, the plain statement rule would have
lacked theoretical force without this discussion. Justices White, Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall
dissented with respect to the majority's analysis of the potential constitutional conflict and its
conception of state sovereignty. Id. at 474 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 461.
39. Id. at 460.
40. Id. at 460 (quoting Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900)).
41. Id.
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government.42 The scope of autonomous decision making, free from national
government interference, is greatly circumscribed.
The Gregory Court noted that the power of a state to stipulate the character of

its office holders is one of the ways in which "a State defines itself as a

'
sovereign."43
This concept easily extends to states hiring law firms to serve the
public purpose of recovering vast Medicaid expenditures. If Congress cannot
constitutionally interfere with state decisions regarding state officers' retirement
ages, then presumably Congress cannot put a ceiling on the salariesearned by state
officers. For example, Congress may not constitutionally enact a law prohibiting
states from paying their governors more than $200,000 a year. It requires only a
short, logical leap from this position to reach the conclusion that Congress may not
compel states to pay private attorneys $250 or less per hour for services rendered
to the states. The only significant distinction is that the governor is a state officer,
whereas the law firm is an independent contractor paid by the state." However, this
distinction is largely without a difference; the primary justifications for state
autonomy in setting terms of employment are the same. In both cases, the states
have exercised independence in setting generous compensation levels to attract
qualified individuals to serve the public by performing important, high-profile state
missions.

B. New York v. United States
A year after the Gregory decision, the Court recognized more extensive
constitutional protection for state sovereignty inNew Yorkv. UnitedStates.4 s In this
case, the Court addressed a challenge to three incentive provisions ofthe Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that sought to encourage states
to "'provid[e] ... for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within
[their] borders."' 46 The Court held that the "take title" provisions of the Act, which
compelled states either to regulate pursuant to Congress's directions or take title to,
and possession of,the waste, unconstitutionally encroached upon the zone of state

42. Article 83 of the German Basic Law charges the Lander with implementing the bulk offederal
legislation. For decades the German system has been plagued by a "creeping centralization" that has
gradually eroded the autonomy and power of the Lander. See Simon Bulmer, TerritorialGovernment,
in DEVELOPMENTS INWEST GERMAN POLITICS, at 42 (Gordon Smith et al. eds., 1989). As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the Framers of the United States Constitution considered and rejected the
possibility of allowing Congress to compel the states to legislate in the service of congressional
objectives. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164-66 (1992).
43. Gregory,501 U.S. at 460.
44. Or, stated differently, the office of the governor is a permanent part of the structure of state
government, whereas the law firm is a temporary ally of the state and not part of the state government
itself.
45.505 U.S. 144 (1992).
46. Id. at 150-51 (quoting Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act § 4(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 96573, 94 Stat. 3348 (1980)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/4
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sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment. The Court concluded that Congress
cannot constitutionally coerce the states to take either action and that offering the
states a choice between the two options did not ameliorate this defect.47
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor elaborated at great length upon the
conception ofstate sovereignty that she had described in Gregory.48 What had been
merely a peripheral set of observations in Gregory now lay at the core of the
Court's holding in New York.49 Importantly, Justice O'Connor set out the Court's
new understanding of the Tenth Amendment. She acknowledged that in one sense
the text of the Tenth Amendment is merely the truistic complement of the powers
conveyed in Article I ofthe Constitution." However, she declared that, like the First
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment also imposes an independent constraint on the
powers of Congress: "The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of
Congress ....
[It] confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to
limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States."'" In identifying
such limits, the Court was required to determine "whether an incident of state
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power."52 Once again, the
states' decision-making autonomy was the "incident of state sovereignty" for which
the Court found constitutional protection. The Court declared emphatically that
"[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program." 3
The Court's conclusions in Gregoryand New York are similar: Congress may
neither tell states when to retire theirjudges nor tell states what regulations to enact.
The implications for the proposed attorneys' fees cap are plain. Just as state
decisions regarding the tenure of state officers or the shape of state legislation are
shielded by the Tenth Amendment, so too are decisions regarding the terms of state
contracts. The power to make each of these decisions autonomously is an incident
of state sovereignty. Thus, Congress may not prohibit a state from determining the
fee that it wishes to pay to a private law firm.
Comprehending the New York decision requires an understanding of what the
Court did not hold. This case was not one in which the Court held that Congress

47. Id. at 175-77. In a 6-to-3 vote, the Court simply declared the provision unconstitutional.
48. See id. at 155-69.

49. Although Justice O'Connor did not explicitly describe the Court's New York holding as the
direct descendant of Gregory'sholding and state sovereignty analysis, her discussion was plainly the
natural extension of her conclusions iterated only one year earlier in Gregory. Indeed, she repeatedly
cited and quoted Gregory on the matter ofstate sovereignty. See id.passim.Justices White, Blackmun,
and Stevens, the three dissenters in New York, similarly dissented from her statements on the subject

inGregory.
50. Id.at 156. Justice O'Connor noted that "the Tenth Amendment 'states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered."' Id.(quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941)).
51. New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57.
52. Id. at 157.
53. Id. at 188.
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lacked the power to regulate private individuals or to pre-empt state regulations.
Congress could have permissibly exercised its own power over interstate commerce
to require generators of low-level radioactive waste to dispose of such waste
according to Congress's wishes.
However, Congress could not require the states to regulate private individuals
according to congressional inclinations. Requiring the states to do so would have
effectively reduced the states to subservient administrative units of the national
government. 4 The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution considered and
rejected such a system,5" choosing instead a framework "that confers upon Congress
the power to regulate individuals, not States."56 Accordingly, "the Constitution has
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
govern according to Congress' instructions."57 This observation is pertinent to the
proposed attorneys' fees cap. Should it wish to do so, Congress may use its power
over interstate commerce to cap all lawyers' contingency fees nationally. Congress
may also limit the amount of money that thefederal government pays to private law
firms for services rendered to the federal government. However, Congress may not
compel the states to adopt the proposed fee cap in their contracts with private law
firms.
Implicit in this conclusion, as in the New York holding, is the assumption that
the federal government must treat the states as fellow sovereign entities. The
Supremacy Clause concedes congressional superiority in the regulation of
individuals;58 however, Congress does not possess an elevated status in the direct
relationship between state governments and the national government. Indeed, prior
to the enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment, 9 the Constitution suggested the
opposite. The original constitutional provision charged state legislatures with the
selection of United States senators.60 The fact that delegates from the state

54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
55. New York, 505 U.S. at 164-66.
56.Id. at 166. The New York Court clearly stated that Congress may regulate individuals, but not
the states as states, within the scope of its enumerated powers. However, the Court left ambiguous the
extent of congressional power to regulate individuals and states together, as part of a generally
applicable regulatory program. See id. at 177-78. This sort of congressional action is what the Court
declared unconstitutional in NationalLeagueofCitiesand then held constitutional in Garcia.See supra
notes 24-32 and accompanying text. Regardless, the proposed attorneys' fees cap does not fall into this
third, ambiguous category of congressional action. The proposed cap plainly targets the states asstates.
57. New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
58. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law ofthe Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNST. art.
VI, cl.
2.
59. "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected
by the people thereof, for six years... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII (emphasis added).
60. "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen
by the Legislaturethereof, for six years ... ." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl.
1, amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII, § 1 (emphasis added).
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legislatures comprised one house of Congress strongly implied that Congress, at
times, would be expected to do the state legislatures' collective bidding. In this
sense, the Seventeenth Amendment may be understood as having had the indirect
effect of placing Congress and the state legislatures on equal footing in their
relationships with one another.
In any case, the Framers clearly did not intend for the federal government to
control the behavior of state governments. The delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention of 1787 discussed and rejected the New Jersey Plan, under which the
federal government and the state governments would have regulated individuals
jointly. Like the Articles of Confederation, this plan stipulated that Congress must
gain the consent of the states before legislating." The New Jersey Plan was
challenged on various grounds, including the possibility that it might result in
federal coercion of the state governments to follow Congress's preferences.' In the
Convention debates, the Framers generally assumed that the New Jersey Plan would
entail federal direction of the states. William Patterson, who introduced the New
Jersey Plan, described this objection to his plan as follows: "There must be a
national Governm[en]t to operate individually upon the People in the first Instance,
and not upon the States ... .,63 After considerable debate, the Convention delegates
rejected the New Jersey Plan, opting instead for a version of the Virginia Plan under
which the federal government would be empowered to regulate individuals directly
without using the states as its agents.' Madison revisited this subject in the
Federalist Papers. After describing the failure of the political system of the
Netherlands, in which the central government enjoyed authority to direct the
confederacy's constituent states, Madison insisted that the proposed U.S.
Constitution did not create such "a sovereignty over sovereigns" or a "government
over governments." Such an arrangement would have been a "solecism in theory"
and would likely have been "subversive of the order and ends of civil polity" in
practice. 5
The principle that the Constitution does not countenance federal regulation of
the states as states lies at the heart of the New York decision and presents the most
fundamental barrier to the proposed attorneys' fees cap. Just as congressional
compulsion of the states to legislate on Congress's behalf offends this principle, so
too would congressional nullification of contracts negotiated by the states with
private entities. The cap would effectively say to the states, "You may not enter into
contracts containing these terms." This type of congressional restriction on state
61. 1THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 243-44 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
62. See id. at 255-66. The Court in New York emphasized this objection to the New Jersey Plan.
New York, 505 U.S. at 164-65.
63. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 61, at 275.
64. See id. at 21, 257-80, 313.
65. THE FEDERALISTNO. 20, at 128-29 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The Court
in New York quoted these words in support of its contention that "the Framers did not intend that

Congress should exercise [its interstate commerce] power through the mechanism of mandating state
regulation." New York, 505 U.S. at

180.
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behavior cannot be easily squared with the New York holding."
The New York Court looked not only to the Framers' intent in reaching its
holding but also to considerations of constitutional policy. The Court professed that
"where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of
both state and federal officials is diminished."'67 This loss of accountability stems
from the fact that when state officials are forced to make policy according to
congressional design, the state officials are exposed to any public disapproval while
"federal officials ... remain insulated from any electoral" backlash. 8 Likewise,
undeserving state officials enjoy the benefits of any popular policy making, while
the responsible federal officials go unrecognized. As a result, the political incentives
to make good policy become skewed. Such accountability considerations are also
present with respect to the proposed attorneys' fees cap. Congressional intervention
to cap the previously negotiated attorneys' fees would distort political incentives by
stealing for the states an extremely good deal in legal representation. The states

would not be held politically accountable for the deal that they negotiated-be it a
good deal or a bad one. Moreover, in future negotiations for legal representation in
any nationally significant lawsuit, the states would possess an incentive to offer
private firms high contingency fees with the expectation that Congress would later
intervene and reduce the fees.
One other aspect of the New York holding bears mentioning at this point. The
Court declared that Congress may not "'commandeer' state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes."69 Congress had commandeered the states
by forcing them to adopt a federal scheme for the disposal of low-level radioactive
waste. In the wake of New York, lower federal courts have elaborated upon what,
precisely, it means to "commandeer" the instruments of state government. In
addition to the Brady Act discussed below, 70 at least one other federal act has been
66. One might argue that such a strong iteration of the principle that the federal government may
not regulate the states as states proves too much. Taken to its logical extreme, this principle calls into
question any federal law that requires states to adopt particular regulatory standards or refrain from
licensing certain behavior. For example, federal laws regarding sports gambling not only prevent
individuals from operating betting schemes based on athletic games but also prevent states from
licensing such behavior: "It shall be unlawful for ... a governmental entity to sponsor, operate,
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact... a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting,
gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly.. . on one or more competitive games in
which amateur or professional athletes participate .... "28 U.S.C. § 3702 (1994) (exempting Nevada
from these provisions). Arguably, the no-regulation-of-the-states-as-states principle demands that such
congressional action be adjudged unconstitutional. However, this understanding is not as drastic as it
might first appear. Congress could still regulate individual behavior, including participation by
individoals in sports gambling schemes (assuming that regulation of sports gambling is contemplated
by the Commerce Clause). Because the Supremacy Clause of Article VI would render void any
countervailing state laws permitting sports gambling, Congress could reach the same objective through
constitutionally sound means. See supra note 52.
67. New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
68. Id. at 169.
69. Id. at 175.
70. See infra Part II.C.
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held unconstitutional on these grounds. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act bars
state departments of motor vehicles from knowingly disclosing personal information
contained in motor vehicle records, including addresses, photographs, and social
security numbers, but not including telephone numbers and driving records.'
Federal district courts in South Carolina and Oklahoma have determined that this
act impermissibly commandeers state agencies to enforce federal preferences
regarding the dissemination of such information.72
Although the concept of commandeering state government is not without
limits,73 it encompasses a wide range of possible federal actions. In all likelihood,
the proposed attorneys' fees cap lies within its broad boundaries. In the cases where
a violation of the Tenth Amendment was found, the federal government achieved
its policy objective by ordering state officers, agencies, or legislatures to behave in
a certain way. The same certainly may be said of the attorneys' fees cap. Because
Congress deems the negotiated attorneys' fees in the multi-state tobacco settlement
to be excessive, it orders state governments to limit their fees to figures within
Congress's preferred range. In this sense, the proposed cap commandeers the states'
contracting authority. This conclusion is further supported by the holding in Printz
v. United States,74 in which the Court expanded upon the concept of
commandeering the instruments of state governments.

71. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721-2725 (West Supp. 1997).
72. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 982-86 (D.S.C. 1997); Oklahoma v. United States, No.
CIV-97-1423-R, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14455 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 1997).
73. In at least three instances, lower federal courts have found no commandeering of state
governments when presented with constitutional challenges to federal statutes under the New York
precedent. In New Jerseyv. UnitedStates, 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit found no Tenth
Amendment violation in the federal government's alleged failure to stem the tide of illegal immigration
which, according to the state of New Jersey, compelled the state to incur expenses incarcerating and
educating illegal aliens. The Court held that "[n]either the state's incarceration of illegal aliens nor its
obligation to educate illegal aliens results from any command by Congress." Id. at 467. In Strahanv.
Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963 (D. Mass. 1996), the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts found no commandeering ofstate government in the Endangered Species Act and Marine
Mammal Protection Act. The state of Massachusetts alleged that a federal judicial injunction against
Massachusetts licensing practices under the Acts would be tantamount to commandeering the
Commonwealth's commercial licensing process. The Court found no Tenth Amendment violation
because the Endangered Species Act "does not require the Commonwealth to regulate commercial
fishing at all"; rather, it affords Massachusetts "the 'critical alternative' of declining to 'administer'

the federal program." Id. at 979-80. In United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093 (D.R.I. 1996), the
federal district court for the District of Rhode Island upheld the Child Support Recovery Act against
a Tenth Amendment challenge premised on the New York holding. The Court found that although the
Act provided for relitigation in federal courts of issues decided by state courts, the goal ofthe Act was
to strengthen state enforcement efforts with respect to child support orders. Therefore, no
unconstitutional invasion of state sovereignty took place. Id. at 1105-06.
74. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
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C. Printz v. United States
In Printz, the Court delivered its most confident shot across the bow of
Congress yet. The Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act that required the chief law enforcemaent officers of
localities to administer background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.75
Reiterating its New York holding that the federal government may not force states
to enact or administer federal regulatory schemes76 and characterizing the Brady Act
as an attempt to "press" state and local law enforcement officers into federal
service, 7 the Court concluded that the Brady Act unconstitutionally compelled state
and local officers to implement a federal regulatory program.78 Writing for the
majority,79 Justice Scalia offered a detailed exposition on the history of
congressional direction of state governments, the writings of the Framers on the
subject and the relevant prior holdings of the Court.8" His discursive opinion was
peppered with observations relevant to the proposed cap on attorneys' fees.
At the heart of the Printz decision was the general principle that "state
legislatures are not subject to federal direction."'" From this axiom, the Court
derived the corollary principle that the states' executive power is also shielded from
federal command. As the Court summarized, "The Federal Government may neither
issue directivesrequiringthe States to addressparticularproblems, nor command
the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce
a federal regulatory program."82 The first half of this sentence bears directly upon
the proposed cap on attorneys' fees. The proposed cap can be fairly characterized
as a congressional directive requiring the states to address a particular problem.
Private law firms stand to reap an unusually large financial reward for their efforts
to recoup tobacco-related Medicaid expenditures. Not only does the proposed cap
require the states to address this problem, the legislation mandates precisely how
they should do so--by paying their private attorneys no more than $250 per hour,
with the total fees not to exceed $5 million. As such, the proposed fees cap
constitutes a federal directive prohibited under Printz.

75. For a description of the relevant provisions of the Act, see id.at 2368-69.
76. Id. at 2380, 2384.
77. Id. at 2369.
78. Id. at 2384.

79. The Court split five to four in this decision, with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer dissenting. Of the dissenting four, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer had not been members of the
Court at the time of the New York decision. Justice Stevens dissented on both occasions. Justice Souter
voted with the majority in New York, but dissented in Printz.He explained this apparent inconsistency
by drawing a distinction between telling state legislatures what to legislate and telling state executive
officers what to execute. Souter maintained that the former was impermissible because of the
discretionary nature of legislative power, but the latter was permissible because executive power is
inherently subject to direction. See id. at 2402 &n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370-84.

81. Id. at 2373.
82. Id. at 2384 (emphasis added).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/4

14

Kobach: Contingency Fees May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A Constitutiona

1998]

INTERFERENCE WITH TOBACCO LITIGATION CONTRACTS

The Printz opinion echoed the common theme of Gregory and New York:
beyond simply confirming that the federal government is one of enumerated powers,
the Tenth Amendment assures the states' decision-making autonomy. Framing this
principal in terms of spheres of sovereignty, Madison stated, "[T]he local or
municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no
more subject within their respective spheres to the general authority, than the
general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere."83 The Printz Court
quoted Madison in this regard" and concluded that "[i]t is an essential attribute of
the States' retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous
within their proper sphere of authority."8 Application of this concept to the
proposed cap on attorneys' fees yields further support for the view that such
congressional action would be unconstitutional. Arguably, the amount of money a
state chooses to spend in its contracts with private entities is entirely within a
protected sphere of state autonomy.86 If Congress can constitutionally interfere with
a state contract for legal representation and declare the contract void because, in
Congress's eyes, the state agreed to a "bad deal," then when would Congress ever
be forbidden from declaring a state contract void because it is a bad deal? The
logical implications border on the absurd: Congress could tell states that they are
paying their elected representatives too much, spending too much money on
computers, paying teachers too little, and so on. Not surprisingly, the best way to
avoid this slippery slope is to stay off the scarp altogether-by recognizing that
contractual terms between states and private entities lie within the states' sphere of
autonomous decision making. 7
This separation of state and federal decision-making prerogatives was a
variation on the theme of state decision-making autonomy that resonated throughout
the Printzopinion. The Court stressed that a state government has "'its own privity,
its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are

83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
84. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377.
85.Id.at 2381.
86. There are, of course, limits on the terms of such state contracts that are imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights.
87. This attention to spheres of autonomous state decision making in Printzseems to undermine
the Court's earlier holding in Garcia that Congress can subject state and local governments to the
minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Wages
and overtime requirements are terms in employment contracts between states and individuals. However,
a critical difference exists between the minimum wage and the proposed fees cap. As the Court stressed
in Garcia, the minimum wage is part of a general nationwide program constraining all employers.
"SAMTA faces nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of
thousands of other employers, public as well as private, have to meet." Garcia,469 U.S. at 554. In
contrast, the proposed attorneys' fees cap specifically and solely targets those contracts in which a state
is the client. In this way, the proposed fees cap would constitute a direct congressional affront to state
autonomy. Presumably, Congress could regulate the contingency fees of all attorneys in the country,
regardless of the client, and retain the constitutional blessing of Garcia.
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governed by it,"' apart from any obligations that Congress has to its own
constituencies." The area of autonomous decision making protected by the Tenth
Amendment coincides with this area of privity of obligation. A state legislature's
decision to adopt a particular statute providing for the disposal of radioactive waste
is borne of the legislators' obligations and duties owed to the residents of the state.
Similarly, the obligations and expectations that exist between a law enforcement
officer and the community that he protects shape his decisions to monitor the selling
of handguns and to take other steps to prevent crime. This privity of obligation
analysis also applies to the proposed cap on attorneys' fees. When launching a civil
suit to recoup smoking-related Medicaid expenditures from the tobacco industry,
a state has an obligation to its citizens to retain an adequate share of any recovered
damages.89 However, Congress has no authority to second-guess the state and
declare that the state is failing to fulfill that obligation. Congress has its own,
independent obligations to its own constituencies that it must meet. The
Constitution does not appoint Congress the guarantor of the states' obligations to
their citizens.
Finally, the Printz Court observed that where congressional action
"compromise[s] the structural framework of dual sovereignty," no judicial
"balancing" of competing interests is appropriate." Rather, Congress is absolutely
prohibited from intruding upon protected areas of state autonomy, regardless of the
persuasiveness of Congress's policy arguments. "It is the veryprincipleof separate
state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the
various interests can overcome that fundamental defect."'" Thus, any congressional
insistence that important or even compelling federal interests are at stake would be
entirely beside the point.
Of course, one may question whether Congress could even articulate a
cognizable federal interest in interfering with the attorneys' fees negotiated by the
states. Congress might assert an interest in ensuring that the state governments
retain as much of the recovered damages as possible in order to fatten state coffers
and thereby reduce the states' demand for federal grants. However, this indirect and
attenuated federal interest has little persuasive force, as the states are quite capable
of looking after their own financial well-being without interference from a Congress
that has had great difficulty managing its own budget. Alternatively, one might
assert that the federal purpose is one of comity-a congressional attempt to assist
the states by correcting their blunders. Arguably, returning billions of dollars to

88. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
89. In determining the contingency fee that it is willing to pay, a state might consider a variety of
factors, including the risk that such a suit would ultimately fail, the prevailing market contingency fees
for similar legal services, the minimum fee necessary to retain superior counsel, and the expectations
of the public with respect to the lawyers' share of any damages awarded.
90. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
91. Id.
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state governments that supposedly negotiated a bad deal is a legitimate federal
purpose. However, such a purpose rings hollow when one considers that the states
were free to negotiate whatever attorneys' fees they wished. The states evidently
concluded that the selected contingency fees properly balanced the competing state
interests in maximizing recovery to the government and encouraging effective
litigation. A third possible federal purpose served by the fees cap might be the
deterrence of future coordinated lawsuits by state governments seeking to recover.
Medicaid or other expenditures from culpable industries. However, this purpose is
the least colorable of the three. By and large, members of Congress have expressed
satisfaction, rather than dismay, at the states' success in recovering Medicaid

expenditures and obtaining concessions from the tobacco industry. Therefore, the
proposed cap on attorneys' fees does not likely reflect a desire to deter similar suits
in the future. Furthermore, there has been no suggestion that a similar wave of suits
is imminent or even possible in the future. Thus, there appears to be no defensible
federal interest behind the fees cap proposal.
In sum, the Gregory-New York-Printz line of decisions has recognized
constitutional protection for the decision-making autonomy of state governments.
The proposed cap would intrude upon this protected zone of state sovereignty.
However, even if the Tenth Amendment were interpreted as presenting no barrier
to the proposed action, the fees cap would still run afoul of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
III. THE TAKINGS ISSUE
The Fifth Amendment commands that property be not taken without
making just compensation. Valid contracts are property, whether the
obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State, or the United
92
States.
The government effects a taking in its most recognizable form when it acquires,
confiscates, physically occupies, or simply destroys private property.93
Compensation is required regardless of whether the private property is real property,
chattel property, or money.94 However, the Court has long acknowledged that a
compensable taking may also occur as a result of a regulatory action that is not a
straightforward acquisition, occupation, or destruction of property. The best known
92. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (Brandeis, J.).
93. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441-42 (1982) (finding
compensation required for installation of cable television facilities on real property); United States v.
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) ("[W]here the government by the construction of a dam or other
public works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to substantially destroy their value there is
a taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment.").
94. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980) (holding
that state government appropriation of interest earned on an interpleader account constituted a
compensable taking of private property).
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iteration of this principle came from Justice Holmes in PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v.
Mahon: "[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking."95 Although the Court in Mahon was not
the first to declare a regulatory taking compensable,96 it marked the beginning of a
series of twentieth-century decisions recognizing such takings.97
Arguably, one may view the proposed cap on attorneys' fees as a regulatory
taking because Congress would be regulating the fees that state governments may
pay their attorneys without specifically identifying and seizing property. However,
the taking at issue here does not fit easily into the regulatory takings category.
Regulatory takings typically involve government-imposed limitations on usage
rights or other rights that normally adhere to private property rather than actual
government acquisition of property. The proposed fees cap does not circumscribe
property rights in this fashion. Alternatively, one may view the proposed fees cap
as an acquisitionof the private law firms' property and a transfer of that property
to the state governments. 98 The author favors the latter characterization, viewing the
fees cap as more like a direct confiscation of property than a regulation of
property.99 Nonetheless, analyzing the fees cap initially as a regulatory taking..0 is
useful for two reasons. First, in the past the Court has examined congressional
interference with the contractual rights of parties to an existing contract through the
regulatory takings lens, even though such interference fits uneasily under this
label. ' Second, considering the Court's regulatory takings analysis in cases of non-

95. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
96. Although Mahon is the most famous early statement of the view that regulatory takings must
be compensated, the doctrine actually dates to the early decades of the nineteenth century, when state
courts applying natural law, common law, or theirrespective state constitutions required compensation
for what were essentially regulatory takings. In two decisions in the 1870s, the Supreme Court also
apparently endorsed this view. See Kris W. Kobach, The OriginsofRegulatory Takings: Setting the
Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. RFV. 1211, 1267-76 (discussing Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 497 (1870), and Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871)).
97. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (requiring
compensation where state regulation preventing building of any permanent habitable structure on
coastal property denied landowner all economically viable use of property); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (holding that flood control
ordinance that denied landowner all use of his property, even if only temporarily, required
compensation); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987) (holding that the provision of the Indian
Land Consolidation Act that prevented the transfer of Indian land by intestacy or devise resulted in a
taking of decedent's right to pass property at death); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 17879 (1979) (holding that a taking occurred when the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act required that
a privately owned pond converted into a navigable waterway by its owner be open to the public).
98. For an attempt to create a logical taxonomy of takings which divides them into three general
categories-acquisitive, destructive, and devaluative-and numerous subcategories, see Kobach,supra
note 96, at 1223-28.
99. See discussion infra Part III.B.
100. See discussion infra Part III.A.
101. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit GuarantyCorp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986), the Court used the
regulatory takings criteria of Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978), to assess a claim that the withdrawal liability provisions of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
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regulatory takings of intangible or contractual property is often useful. In various
regulatory takings cases, the Court has devoted considerable attention to the
question of when an expectation rises to the level of a property interest protected by
the Takings Clause. In any event, both approaches yield the same ultimate
conclusion: the proposed cap constitutes a compensable taking of private property.
A.

The Regulatory Takings Framework

Although the Court has yet to arrive at a "set formula" for determining when
a government regulation constitutes a compensable taking, 2 it has defined the
general contours of such takings. The Court recognizes two situations in which the
government has effected a compensable taking per se without any case-specific
inquiry into the value of the property or the government interests behind the
restraint: first, when a regulation compels a property owner to suffer a physical
invasion of his property;' and second, when a regulation deprives a landowner of
all economically beneficial use of his property." 4 In regulatory situations falling
outside of these two categories, including that presented by the proposed cap, the
Court has identified three factors that are critical in determining whether the
challenged government action constitutes a compensable taking: (1) "the economic
impact ofthe regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"; and (3) "the character of
the government action."' 5
Of course, the preliminary question that must be answered with respect to the
proposed cap on attorneys' fees is whether what is taken can be considered
"property." Well-settled constitutional jurisprudence affirms that valid contracts
may create property rights, and the Takings Clause prohibits the government from
impairing the property rights in such contracts without providingjust compensation.
As the Supreme Court's 1934 holding in Lynch v. United States pronounced,
"[v]alid contracts are property" protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 6 This statement in Lynch, though often cited, was not the Court's
first announcement of this principle. In 1897, the Court declared flatly that "a
contract is property, and, like any other property, may be taken under condemnation
proceedings for public use. Its condemnation is of course subject to the rule ofjust

Amendments Act of 1980 amounted to an uncompensated taking of private property from an employer
withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan, from the employer's trustees, and from the plan
participants. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224-27.
102. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
103. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
104. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
105. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
106. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (holding that the government annulment
of contractual rights under War Risk Insurance Policies constituted a compensable taking of private
property).
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compensation ...
,,o This iteration of takings protection for contracts was
grounded in even earlier precedent.' 8 The Court has not deviated from this view in
the century of takings jurisprudence that has unfolded since.' 9
To establish a compensable property interest, a claimant must show more than
a "'unilateral expectation or an abstract need"'; the claimant must present a
legitimate claim of entitlement reflecting a "'reasonable investment-backed
expectation."'. 0 The nature of the tobacco litigation contingency fee arrangements
in most states is clear: the law firms have more than a unilateral expectation of
financial gain. They have valid, binding contracts for legal services. As
consideration for their negotiated returns, the law firms have rendered thousands of
hours of legal work. Moreover, they undertook this investment of resources in
detrimental reliance on such contractual arrangements. This investment-backed
expectation is sufficient to establish a valid property interest within the scope of the
Takings Clause."' A contractual property right vests for Fifth Amendment purposes
when the contract is made and consideration is given, even if the right does not fully

107. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 690 (1897) (citation omitted).
108. The Long Island Water Supply Court noted that Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 (1880),
implied the same view regarding the compensability of government takings of contracts. Long Island
Water Supply, 166 U.S. at 690.
109. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,223 (1986) ("Contracts may
create rights of property... ."); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46 (1960) (holding that the
governmental destruction of a materialmen's lien rights required compensation under Fifth
Amendment); Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 121 (1924) (holding that
government expropriation of rights granted under a shipbuilding contract constituted a compensable
taking of private property).
110. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984) (quoting Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
111. See FarW. Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 746 F. Supp. 1042,
1050 (D. Or. 1990) ("Plaintiffs' property interest.., is clear. They have farmore than a mere unilateral
expectation in the Conversion Agreement. They have a valid, binding contract, in reliance on which the
Investors risked $27 million."), rev'd,FarW. Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Director, Office ofThrift Supervision,
951 F.2d 1093, 1096 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the takings claim was voluntarily abandoned
by plaintiff bank during appeal after plaintiff was placed in receivership); Rhode Island Higher Educ.
Assistance Auth. v. Cavazos, 749 F. Supp. 414, 423 (D.R.I. 1990) (holding unconstitutional the
amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965 that retroactively require state student loan guaranty
agencies to transfer excess reserves to the Secretary of Education and permitting the Secretary to
withhold reimbursement for losses), rev'd sub nom., Rhode Island Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v.
Secretary, United States Dep't. ofEduc., 929 F.2d 844, 850-52 (1st Cir. 1991) (reversing on grounds
that Congress had implicitly reserved the right to amend or repeal the Act and thereby retained
sovereign authority over the program).
[T]he facts in Lynch are strikingly similar to those in this case. In both cases, the
plaintiffs contracted with government agencies pursuant to statutes expressly
authorizing the agencies to enter into such contracts. In each case, consideration
was given in exchange for the agency's commitment. In one case it took the form
of premiums, and in the other it took the form ofloan guarantees made in reliance
on that commitment.
Cavazos, 749 F. Supp. at 422.
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mature until the occurrence of some future event." 2 Indeed, the Court has suggested
in the context of materialmen's liens that the Takings Clause protects such
contractual rights regardless of whether the rights-holders have taken statutorilyrequired action to enforce their claims." 3
Application of the three factors identified by the Supreme Court in Penn
Central"' to the proposed congressional interference with the contingency fees for
the states' law firms evinces a compensable taking of private property. First, the
government's regulatory action must have a significant economic impact on the
claimant. The proposed fees cap would plainly satisfy this criterion. The exact
amount of property that Congress would strip from the law firms varies from state
to state, 15 but the vast magnitude of the potential taking is clear. In the hypothetical
case of a state recovering $2 billion with twenty-five percent going to counsel, the
law firms representing the state would be entitled to $500 million absent
congressional interference. Under the proposed cap, however, the firms employed
by the state would receive only $5 million-a loss of $495 million."'
Second, the claimants must hold a distinct, investment-backed expectation in
the taken property. Essentially, this requirement means that the loss must not be
entirely prospective; the property owner must have invested considerable
expenditures into the venture." 7 In the present case, the law firms' investmentbacked expectations are evident in the specific terms of the contingency fee
agreements and in the massive investment of lawyer hours and other resources in
reliance on these contracts. This commitment of resources constitutes an investment
based on a contractually-embedded expectation that an agreed percentage of
recovered damages from the tobacco industry will flow to the law firms. These
expenditures, as well as other actions taken in reliance on the contracts, can
sufficiently establish the investment-backed expectation required for a takings
112. "Like the policyrights in Lynch, RIHEAA's rightto reimbursement vested when the contract
was made and the consideration given even though the right to collect would not mature until
occurrence of the specified event (i.e. death of the insured or the occurrence of a default)." Cavazos,
749 F. Supp. at 422.
113. InArmstrong v. UnitedStates, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), the Court held that materialmen's liens
constituted private property protected by the Takings Clause even though, under Maine law, the lien
had to be enforced by attachment of the vessel or supplies, and the claimants had taken no steps to
attach the uncompleted work. "Nevertheless, they were entitled to resort to the specific property for the
satisfaction of their claims." Armstrong,364 U.S. at 44.
114. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
115. The amount of the taking would also have to be modified by present discounted value

calculations, depending on when the payments would have occurred in the absence of the fees cap.
116. The wording of the first fees cap proposal legislation is ambiguous at this stage. In relevant
part it states: "fI]fany attorneys' fees are paid... in connection with an action maintained by a State

against one or more tobacco companies ...such fees shall ... be limited to a total of $5,000,000."
Amend. 1125 to Amend. 1075 to amend S.1061, 105th Cong. (1997). Whether this amount is the
combined total that any single state may pay (to be divided among the various law firms involved) or
whether no single firm is to be paid more than $5,000,000 is unclear.
117. See WILLIAM A. FIsCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 50

(1995).
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claim." 8 Arguably, the expectations inherent in a lawyer's contingency fee
arrangement are the epitome of investment-backed expectations. Lawyers operating
under such contracts invest substantial resources in litigation on behalf of their
clients, often bearing entirely the risk that the ventures will fail. What makes the
bearing of this risk financially justifiable is the certainty of payment of a bargainedfor percentage of any award. Although such lawyers cannot normally be certain of
their success or failure in advance, they can be certain of their percentage. It is this
concrete expectation that the proposed fees cap would take.
Not all contractual expectations are sufficiently concrete to create a property
right protected by the Fifth Amendment. Courts have found that no such expectation
exists in situations where aclaimant's expectation ofcontract performance is highly
uncertain. For example, substantial uncertainty was present in several cases
engendered by the dissolution of communist Yugoslavia and the United States
government's freezing of Yugoslav assets. In these cases, the claimants'
expectations, in the form of contracts with Yugoslav agencies operating in the
United States, rested upon the assumption that the United States would maintain
stable relations with the former government of Yugoslavia." 9 Similarly heavy
uncertainty was present with respect to the possession of permits to import arms
from the People's Republic of China. 2 '
Equivalent ambiguity is not present in the contracts between the states and their
counsel for legal representation in tobacco litigation. Although the ultimate success
or failure of these lawsuits was highly uncertain at their commencement, no
contemporaneous uncertainty existed regarding the ability and willingness of state
governments to pay their counsel the negotiated contingency fees in the event that

118. See Far W. Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 746 F. Supp. 1043,
1050 (D. Or. 1990) ("The Investors invested and Far West commenced its niche-lending business, as
well as other steps in reliance on the Conversion Agreement. It is hard to imagine any more distinct an
investment-backed expectation could be.").
119. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Sage had no reasonable investment-backed expectation to be free from
government interference with its leases to the SFRY organizations.
Prior to 1981, statutory and constitutional authority existed that permitted
the government to take various actions against other countries, including the
blocking of assets and closure of foreign government offices.
Id.; Rockefeller Ctr. Properties v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995) (compelling performance
of contractual terms "'is contingent upon the continuation of friendly relations between nations'
(quoting Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1988))).
While an individual who obtains a permit to import arms may make
120.
commitments in the arms market on the assumption that the permit will
not be revoked before the importation is completed, that assumption
does not constitute a"reasonable investment backed expectation[ ]" of
the type necessary to support a takings claim. That is particularly true
with respect to importations of arms from a country with which the
United States has an arms embargo that is subject to an exemption that
could be terminated at any time.
B-West Imports, Inc. v. United States, 75 F.3d 633, 638 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
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the states recovered Medicaid expenditures from the tobacco industry. One might
argue against the certainty of the law firms' expectation by pointing out that
congressional interference was always in the cards. The very terms of the initial
settlement proposal contemplated congressional involvement in, for example, the
conferral of immunity on the tobacco industry from subsequent similar lawsuits.
However, congressional involvement in facilitating settlement terms between the
parties is quite unlike congressional interference with separate contracts for legal
representation which created vested property rights long before the prospect of a
settlement appeared on the horizon.' Moreover, the utter absence of any clear
federal interest in the terms of these contracts" renders implausible the assertion
that the proposed fees cap was foreseeable and therefore implicitly incorporated into
the attorneys' expectations of payment."
Prior congressional regulation of an area can also defeat a property owner's
assertions of investment-backed expectations. Where the specific contractual
provisions at issue have been the object of congressional regulation prior to the
alleged regulatory taking, the owner of the contractual rights may be unable to
establish that he had a legitimate expectation that his rights would remain free from
subsequent congressional modification. 24 In Connolly v. PensionBenefit Guaranty
Corp.,'" the Court considered a claim that the withdrawal liability provisions of the

121. A number of congressional proposals have also contemplated altering the quantity of
damages awarded to the states. See Tobacco to Be High on Congress' 1998 Agenda, REUTERS, Nov.
'16, 1997, available in INFOBEAT, File No.5987258-3c8. This form of congressional involvement,
although not targeted directly at the contingency fee contracts between the states and their private
attorneys, would nonetheless affect the final amount of the attorneys' fees received. However, such
alteration of the total damages amount is conceptually distinct from congressional meddling with the
attorneys' fees. The attorneys representing a state possess a contractual entitlement to a stipulated
percentage of that state's award, regardless ofthe award's size. The total amount ofdamages that would
be recovered by states suing the tobacco industry was always surrounded by considerable
uncertainty-including uncertainty stemming from the prospect of congressional involvement in any
settlement. Indeed, virtually all contingency fee contracts between lawyers and their clients embrace
uncertainty as to the amount of the lawyers' eventual return. However, such uncertainty does not
jeopardize a lawyer's entitlement to his contracted-for percentage. Accordingly, the uncertainty
engendered by possible congressional alteration of the tobacco litigation settlement amount does not
render infirm the attorneys' expectations of stipulated contingency fees.
122. See supra Part II.C.
123. Even less plausibly, one might also argue that no expectation ever exists with respect to
contingent attorneys' fees because these fees are always reviewable by the relevant judicial authority
on ethical grounds. However, given the fact that the fees at issue here are generally in the twenty-five
percent range, well below the predominant thirty-three percent rate, and the fact that the state attorneys
general are well-equipped to evaluate whether the fees that their states negotiate are too high, it is
unlikely that any judge would have valid reason to sustain an ethical challenge to the fees.
124. The doctrine of construing contracts so as "to avoid foreclosing exercise of sovereign
authority," reiterated by the Court in Bowen v. PublicAgencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment,477
U.S. 41, 52-53 (1986), is not applicable in this instance. That doctrine principally governs contracts
to which the federal government itself is a party and is based on the precept that the government is
presumed not "to have surrendered a sovereign power" by entering a contract ld.at 53.
125. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
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Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 amounted to an
uncompensated taking of private property from an employer withdrawing from a
multiemployer pension plan.'26 The Court applied the three factors of Penn Central
and concluded that the takings claim was weak in all three respects.'27 In assessing
whether employers affected by the Act had a reasonable, investment-backed
expectation that they would remain free from withdrawal liability, the Court noted
that "[p]ension plans.., were the objects of legislative concern long before the
passage of ERISA in 1974. ' 'I2s By the time Congress passed ERISA, it was clear
that withdrawing employers might be subject to liability for their share of their
plan's contributions.'29 After surveying the legislative landscape in this fashion, the
Court concluded that "[p]rudent employers.., had more than sufficient notice not
only that pension plans were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself
might trigger additional financial obligations."'3 No such notice was present with
respect to the proposed attorneys' fees cap. Congress has never attempted to
regulate the amount of money that a state might offer a law firm to sue for the
recovery of tobacco-related Medicaid expenditures. Indeed, Congress has never
attempted to regulate the amount of money that a state might offer a law firm to
conduct any sort of litigation. Although Congress might permissibly exercise its
commerce power to regulate the attorneys' fees that any state can offer to a firm to
conduct tobacco litigation in the future,' congressional interference with existing
contracts impairs investment-backed expectations. Such expectations were clearly
reasonable, given the absence of prior congressional regulation of attorneys' fees
paid by states.
The third Penn Centralfactor relevant to the regulatory takings inquiry is the
nature of the government action. The Penn Central Court posited rather vaguely
that a taking is more likely to be found where the government physically invades
private property than where interference with property "arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."'3 This description of extremes provided little help in assessing the
infinite number of situations that lie in between.33 However, in Connolly,the Court
126. Id.at 221. The appellants also asserted that the Act amounted to a taking from the employer's
trustees and from the plan participants. Id.
127. See id. at 224-27.
128. Id. at 226.
129. Id. at 227.
130. Id.

131. The possibility of regulating attorneys' fees negotiated in the future assumes that the Tenth
Amendment barriers prohibiting such congressional action do not exist. It also assumes that such a fees
cap falls within Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, the Court's limitation of the
commerce power in UnitedStates v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), notwithstanding. Although the first
assumption is weak for the reasons described in Part I, the second assumption is probably valid because
most of the states suing the tobacco industry hired both in-state law firms and out-of-state law firms
to represent them. See supra Part I.
132. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
133. See FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 50-51.
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suggested that a permanent appropriation of a claimant's assets is as likely to
constitute a taking as is a physical invasion of property.' The proposed attorneys'
fees cap would specifically and directly negate a valuable contractual right held by
the law firms. Unquestionably, it is akin to permanently appropriating the firms'
assets and distributing those assets back to the states. Moreover, the proposed fees
cap would be decidedly unlike the opposite extreme suggested in Penn Central.It
would not be a component of a public program to adjust the benefits and burdens
of economic life that only incidentally or indirectly circumscribed private property
rights. Rather, it would amount to a one-time transfer of assets from a small group
of private law firms to a collection of state governments.
Thus, all three of the Penn Centralfactors suggest that the proposed fees cap
would constitute a compensable taking of private property. However, as noted
above, analysis of the fees cap under the regulatory takings rubric is problematic
because it is not really part of a broad regulatory scheme that restricts usage rights
normally associated with property. It may be more appropriate to treat the taking as
a straightforward acquisition and transfer of contractual property. In this guise, the
fees cap is equally, if not more, likely to present a compensable taking.
B. The Acquisition of ContractualPropertyFramework
The acquisition of contractual property framework regards the proposed fees
cap not as a regulation on private or state behavior but as a simple confiscation of
the law firms' property and a transfer of that property to the relevant state
governments. Once one recognizes that the firms' contractual rights to the
negotiated contingency fees are property rights protected by the Fifth
Amendment,'3 5 the inquiry turns to whether congressional nullification of these
contractual rights can be accurately characterized as a taking. In three twentiethcentury cases, the Supreme Court conducted this inquiry regarding congressional
actions that modified the contractual rights of private parties. The Court
consistently found compensable takings of private property. Each case concerned
a congressional action with significant similarities to the proposed fees cap.
36
The first was the 1924 decision of Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States.
In 1917, Congress passed the Emergency Shipping Act to confer upon the President
various wartime powers, including the power to requisition contracts for the
building of ships and the power to requisition any ship under construction. The
President then delegated these powers to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which
seized the claimant's partially completed ship and ordered its builder to complete
construction "in conformity with.., the contract, plans, and specifications under
134. "[M]ith respect to the nature of the governmental action ... the Government does not
physically invade or permanently appropriate any of the employer's assets for its own use." Connolly,
475 U.S. at 225.
135. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
136. 265 U. S. 106 (1924).
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which construction proceeded prior to the requisition.""' The Fleet Corporation
compensated the claimant in an amount approximately equal to the claimant's
expenditures, albeit slightly less than the claimant's total outlays. 138 The question
before the Court was whether the Fleet Corporation had expropriated the claimant's
contract and rights thereunder. The Court found that the government had indeed
taken the claimant's contractual rights and, therefore, owed the claimant just
compensation for the contract's value.'3 9
As the Court explained, the value of the contract rights may have little to do
with the sum of expenditures made in return for the rights at the time of the taking:
The contract rights of claimant taken are to be distinguished from its
expenditures for the production of the ship. The value of property may be
greater or less than its cost; and this is true of contract rights and other
intangibles as well as of physical things. It is the property and not the cost
of it that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. 4 °
The value of the claimant's contractual rights was sizeable. In taking these rights,
the government "secured the benefit of prices prevailing immediately after the
making of the contract .... At the time of the requisition, costs were higher than
the contract prices."' 4' Thus, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment protected the
increase in the value of a contractual right.'42
This protection ofcontractual rights that have increased in value and reflect farsighted bargaining by their holder is particularly relevant to the proposed fees cap.
The law firms hired by the states possess contractual rights to particular contingency
fees that gradually became more valuable as the legal position of the tobacco
companies weakened and the likelihood of a settlement advantageous to the states
increased. This increase in value is evident in the progressively lower contingency
fees accepted by firms representing states that commenced their suits later in the
game. Insisting, as the proposed fees cap implicitly does, that the law firms are
entitled only to a particular hourly rate for their work is to ignore entirely this shift
in the value of the contingency fee contracts. Brooks-Scanlonplainly indicates that
the Fifth Amendment protects sagacious negotiators by requiring compensation for
the market value of contractual rights rather than merely requiring the government
to reimburse such rights holders for their expenditures.
The Brooks-Scanlon decision is also noteworthy in that the Court distinguished
its earlier holding in Omnia CommercialCo. v. United States, a case in which the
Court found that congressional frustration of a private company's performance

137. Id. at 115-18.
138. See id. at 118-19.

139. Id. at 121,125.
140. Id. at 123 (citing The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 454 (1913)).
141. Id. at 120.
142. See Brooks-Scanlon, 265 U.S. at 123.
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under a contract did not amount to a taking from the would-be recipient of the
' The claimant in Omnia possessed a contractual right for
performance. 43
the
purchase of steel plate. The government's requisition of the steel company's entire
production of steel plate rendered realization of the contract's value impossible."M
Among other differences, the Brooks-Scanlon Court noted that, in Omnia, the
"[d]amages claimed were held too remote."' 45 The Court distinguished the
government's indirect, remote frustration of a contractual right from government
action designed specifically to appropriate a valuable contractual right. The
proposed attorneys' fees cap clearly falls into the latter category. The proposed cap
would not present a situation in which Congress only incidentally and indirectly
handicaps the states in their contract performance by acting upon them in some
other way. Rather, the proposed fees cap would present a narrowly focused federal
order that directly deprives the law firms of property and transfers that property to
the relevant states.
The second decision involving governmefit confiscation of contractual rights
came in 1935 in Louisville JointStockLandBankv. Radford.'46 The case involved
a takings challenge to the Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934. The Act amended the
country's bankruptcy laws to provide relief to bankrupt farmers by affording
bankrupt mortgagors various options to avoid dispossession oftheir property.'4 7 The
bank challenged the Act as an uncompensated taking of various contractual rights
that it held with respect to Radford's property prior to the Act's passage.' 48 The
Court agreed, noting that the "right of the mortgagee to insist upon full payment
before giving up his security has been deemed of the essence of a mortgage.' 49
Specifically, the Court held that the Act resulted in a taking from the bank of the
following contractual property rights:
(1) The right to retain the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is
paid. (2) The right to realize upon the security by ajudicial public sale. (3)
The right to determine when such sale shall be held, subject only to the
discretion of the court. (4) The right to protect its interest in the property
by bidding at such a sale .... (5) The right to control... the property
during the period of default ....

143. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 511-13 (1923).
144. See id.at 507.
145. Brooks-Scanlon, 265 U.S. at 121.
146. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
147. See id. at 575-76.
148. See id. at 560-61.
149. Id. at 580.
150. Id. at 594-95.
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The Court's decision was unequivocal: the Act took from the bank specific
valuable contractual rights and effectively gave them to Radford without providing
compensation to the bank. The Court's parting salvo left no room for doubt:
As we conclude that the Act as applied has [taken specific rights without
compensation], we must hold it void. For the Fifth Amendment commands
that, however great the Nation's need, private property shall not be thus
taken even for a wholly public use withoutjust compensation. If the public
interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of individual
mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors,
resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through
taxation, the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may be
borne by the public.'
The Radford holding undeniably offers strong support for the view that the
proposed attorneys' fee cap would effect an uncompensated taking from the law
firms. The similarities between the two situations are notable. In both instances, the
attempted congressional action provides relief to one side in a set of private
contracts throughout the nation by depriving the other side of particular contractual
rights. The denied rights are valuable and no compensation is provided. However,
the differences between the two situations offer even greater support for the
conclusion that the proposed fees cap would constitute an uncompensated taking.
One vital difference concerns the legislative environment surrounding the two
takings. The upsetting of contractual expectations in Radford constituted a
compensable taking, even though it occurred in the bankruptcy context-an area
riddled with prior legislative activity. In contrast, congressional regulation of
attorneys' fees paid by states did not precede the proposed attorneys' fees cap.
Thus, if, as Penn Centraland its progeny suggest, prior legislation weakens a claim
that investment-backed expectations support an asserted property right,'52 then the
property right that would be confiscated by the proposed attorneys' fees cap stands
on stronger footing than that in Radford.
A second difference between the two situations concerns the nature of the
program under which the taking occurred. In Radford, the taking of rights from
mortgagees was part of a general effort to ease the mounting debt burden faced by
farmers around the country: "[t]he controlling purpose of the Act [was] to preserve
to the mortgagor the ownership and enjoyment of the farm property."'53 The taking
accomplished by the proposed fees cap would not be part of a similarly broad
redistribution of economic burdens. Compared to the taking in Radford, it looks
much less like an interference with property rights arising "from some public

151. Id. at 601-02.
152. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.

153. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594 (1935).
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program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good," which, according to Penn Central,would not likely constitute a
54
taking.1
The third case in which the Court evaluated a congressional action modifying
the contractual rights of private parties and found a compensable taking of private
property was Armstrong v. UnitedStates, decided in 1960'sArmstronginvolved
a claim for just compensation for the value of materialmen's liens. The federal
government had effectively nullified the liens by acquiring uncompleted boat hulls
and manufacturing materials following a shipbuilder's default under a construction
contract. The petitioners claimed that the government's action had destroyed their
liens by rendering them unenforceable, thereby taking their property. 5 6 The Court
agreed and cited Radfordin support of the view that lien rights constitute property
secured by the Takings Clause.'57 The Court concluded that, although the
government did not actually eliminate the materialmen's liens, its actions rendered
them valueless:
After transfer [of the hulls and materials] to the United States the liens
were still valid, but they could not be enforced because of the sovereign
immunity of the Government and its property from suit. The result of this
was a destruction of all petitioners' property rights under their liens,
although, as we have pointed out, the liens were valid and had
compensable value.'
Accordingly, the Court held that the transfer constituted a taking of the lien rights
without compensation.' 59
By echoing the Brooks-Scanlon and Radfordholdings, the Armstrong opinion
further bolsters the position that the proposed fees cap would present an
unconstitutional taking of private property. TheArmstrongCourt also demonstrated
the overlap between this sort of contractual taking and traditional regulatory takings
by noting the difficulty of distinguishing between unconstitutional takings and
consequential repercussions of valid regulatory measures. 6 However, the'Court
was firm in its conviction that the government action at issue was the former:
The total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which
constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth
Amendment "taking" and is not a mere "consequential incidence" of a

154. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

155.364 U.S. 40 (1960).
156. Id. at 41-42.
157. Id. at 44.
158. Id. at 46 (citation and footnote omitted).

159. Id. at 48.
160. Id.
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valid regulatory measure. Before the liens were destroyed, the lienholders
admittedly had compensable property. Immediately afterwards, they had
none. This was not because their property vanished into thin air. It was
because the Government for its own advantage destroyed the value of the
liens.. 16
This conclusion is striking because the government's nullification of the
materialmen's liens was indirect, consequential, and probably unintentional. Ifthe
directness of the destruction of a contractual right is crucial to it being considered
a taking, then the law firms affected by the proposed attorneys' fees cap would have
a more compelling claim than did the materialmen in Armstrong. In this sense,
Armstrongoffers particularly trenchant support for the conclusion that the fees cap
would violate the Takings Clause.
Although the Court has yet to offer a comprehensive framework for'assessing
confiscatory takings of contractual rights, the cases discussed above lay a relatively
coherent foundation. From Brooks-Scanlon, Radford, and Armstrong, one may
glean at least four basic principles. First, government interference with specific,
identifiable contractual rights of private individuals or entities amounts to
government interference with property and is constrained by the compensation
requirement of the Takings Clause. Second, where the government alters
contractual rights and obligations so as to relieve one class of parties and burden
another class, it commits a compensable taking regardless of whether the action
serves a significant public interest. Third, government action is more likely to
constitute a taking if it is a direct and causally proximate alteration of contractual
rights rather than a consequential and remote frustration of such rights. Fourth, the
application of the Takings Clause to rights embedded in contracts protects
escalation in the value of such rights. Therefore, it may have the effect of shielding
far-sighted negotiators and investors from government interference with their gains.
IV. CONCLUSION

Any congressional effort to alter the contingency fee arrangements between
states and their counsel intobacco litigation faces formidable constitutional hurdles.
It would likely violate a core principle of state autonomy protected by the Tenth
Amendment and trench upon property rights safeguarded by the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. With respect to the Tenth Amendment, the Court's GregoryNew York-Printz line of decisions describes an independent barrier to federal
government action beyond the amendment's truistic reflection of whether such
actions fall within the government's enumerated powers. The momentous common
principle of these cases is that the federal government cannot regulate the states as
states in such a way as to commandeer the instruments of state government or

161. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48.
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otherwise interfere with the autonomy of state decision-making. Several corollary
principles are also evident in these decisions. Outside the context of regulating
private behavior, the federal government may neither second-guess and alter state
government decisions nor compel states to spend their money in certain ways. In
these and other respects, the federal government must treat the states as fellow
sovereign entities. Importantly, the Printz Court specifically recognized that the
federal government may not "issue directives requiring the states to address
particular problems."' 62 State governments also possess a privity of obligations with
their citizens that is separate from obligations owed by Congress to its
constituencies. Finally, this constitutional protection of the states' decision-making
autonomy is absolute; no pressing federal interest can license congressional
interference. Not only does the basic principle that the federal government may not
interfere with the decision-making autonomy of the states bode ill for the proposed
attorneys' fees cap, but each of these corollary principles supports the conclusion
that the fees cap would run afoul of the Tenth Amendment.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment poses an independent and equally
compelling constitutional obstacle to the proposed attomeys' fees cap. This obstacle
exists regardless of whether the cap is treated as a regulatory taking or an
acquisitive taking. Analyzed under the rubric of regulatory takings, the fees cap
possesses the hallmarks ofa regulatory taking as described inPenn Central.63 More
appropriately analyzed as an acquisitive taking, it looks unmistakably like
confiscatory takings of contractual rights that the Court has recognized in past
decisions. It interferes with specific contractual rights in a direct manner to benefit
one class of entities and burden another. In sum, there is little doubt that the
proposed fees cap would present an uncompensated taking of private property.

162. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997); see supra notes 75-91 and
accompanying text.
163. See supra Part III.A.
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